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Abstract—With the increasing diversity of Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks, it is becoming extremely challenging to design
a fully protected network. For instance, Stealthy Link Flooding Attack (SLFA) is a variant of DDoS attacks that strives to block access to
a target area by flooding a small set of links, and it is shown that it can bypass traditional DDoS defense mechanisms. One potential
solution to tackle such SLFAs is to apply Moving Target Defense (MTD) techniques in which network settings are dynamically changed
to confuse/deceive attackers, thus making it highly expensive to launch a successful attack. However, since MTD comes with some
overhead to the network, to find the best strategy (i.e., when and/or to what extent) of applying it has been a major challenge. The
strategy is significantly influenced by the attacker’s behavior that is often difficult to guess. In this work, we address the challenge of
obtaining the optimal MTD strategy that effectively mitigates SLFAs while incurs a minimal overhead. We design the problem as a
signaling game considering the network defender and the attacker as players. A belief function is established throughout the
engagement of the attacker and the defender during this SLFA campaign, which is utilized to pick the best response/action for each
player. We analyze the game model and derive a defense mechanism based on the equilibria of the game. We evaluate the technique
on a Mininet-based network environment where an attacker is performing SLFAs and a defender applies MTD based on equilibria of
the game. The results show that our signaling game-based dynamic defense mechanism can provide a similar level of protection
against SLFAs like the extensive MTD solution, however, causing a significantly reduced overhead.
Index Terms—Stealthy Link Flooding Attack, Crossfire Attack, Signaling Game, Moving Target Defense
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1 INTRODUCTION
A recent report by Netscout states that Distributed Denial-
of-Service (DDoS) attacks will continue to grow [1]. Ac-
cording to the report, last year 1.35 Terabits per second
(Tbps) DDoS traffic hit Github, and just after five days of
that incident, 1.7 Tbps DDoS traffic launched against an
unnamed US-based service provider. Even though there are
many DDoS defense mechanisms available [2], they are not
capable of competing with some recent types of attacks. For
instance, there is a new kind of attack where the attacker
does not attack the target network/servers directly [3], [4].
This type of attack is known as Stealthy Link Flooding
Attack (SLFA). The Crossfire attack is an exemplary kind
of SLFAs, and it is primarily performed by congesting the
communication links surrounding the network of the target
servers by sending low-volume traffic over them from many
bots in distributed locations. Since the traffic the bots send
is legitimate, and they do not attack the servers directly, it
is very challenging to detect such attacks using traditional
mechanisms. The consequence of this attack is the block-
age of external access to the servers while they are still
active/running without any problem within the network.
The concept of Moving Target Defense (MTD), in which
the defense is done dynamically, often proactively, by in-
troducing agility to the network behavior, is proven useful
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to defend against such stealthy attacks [5], [6] [7], [8].
This agility brings protection to the system by providing
resistance, as it complicates the tasks of an attacker by
adding inconsistency or confusion in the knowledge of
the system. These features can be implemented in various
ways including but not limited to changing IP addresses
of network devices, the operating system of servers, and
routing information, more often by leveraging the capabil-
ities of Software Defined Networking (SDN). MTD, more
specifically Random Route Mutation (RRM) [9], is found
useful in defending a network system against SLFAs [8].
However, RRM brings significant overhead to the network
since it takes time to update the system characteristic (i.e.,
routing information), and this process is usually applied
not only to malicious users but also to legitimate clients.
This is because the defender is not aware of the type of
a client. Therefore, the concern of when and for whom to
change system parameters in order to minimize the cost of
the defender and impact of the attacker becomes a critical
issue and it should be investigated thoroughly.
Even though there are many research works proposing
defense mechanisms against SLFAs in the literature, they are
mostly reactive solutions in which the attacker made some
harm before the attack is mitigated [10], [11]. In addition
to these works, there are other kinds of proactive defense
mechanisms that apply detection of bots, sending forged
responses to the hosts, or similar approaches [12], [13]. We
argue that bot detection might not be possible considering
that bots often behave similarly to legitimate hosts, and
serving fake replies to hosts is not acceptable since that may
cause letting the legitimate clients use the longer paths and
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2having more delays. Therefore, there is a need for proactive,
dynamic solutions that can harden the system from the
attacks while bringing a minimal service degradation to the
hosts. To the best of our knowledge, this work is the first
to introduce strategic defense against SLFAs in a proactive
manner.
In order to model such a system that achieves the best
efficiency of RRM, we need to design an intelligent defense
mechanism that can take into account the above concerns
for running RRM. To design such a strategic defense mech-
anism, in this paper, we apply a signaling game [14] to
model and analyze the attack and defense actions together.
The results from this analysis assist in applying RRM se-
lectively and appropriately such that the target network
can remain sufficiently protected against Crossfire attacks
and the legitimate clients experience a minimal cost. In this
game, one player constructs a belief about the type of its
opponent. This belief is always updated by the opponent’s
actions. Then, the player can better decide about its optimal
strategy given its belief about the type of player from which
it receives messages. Essentially, we consider the attacker
and the defender as the players of this signaling game. We
analyze the game and compute all potential Bayesian Nash
equilibria. The game results are then used to decide when
and for whom to perform RRM. We name the corresponding
defense mechanism as Strategic RRM.
To evaluate our proposed solution, we first implement a
network using Mininet, a virtual SDN testbed [15], and the
defense mechanism on FloodLight Controller [16]. Then, we
run experiments with extensive RRM, in which the routing
paths are periodically changed, to observe the overhead to
the legitimate clients when there is not any attack in place.
Next, we run the SLFA and realize the reasonable frequency
for periodic RRM, which is used later to compare with
Strategic RRM. Moreover, we consider two kinds of attackers
based on attack approach and capability. In each case, we
report the number of packet losses when the defender
has either no protection, periodic RRM or Strategic RRM.
We show that while periodic RRM provides a significant
improvement to the network defense, it introduces packet
delay as well as packet losses even when there is no attacker
in the system. We also show that Strategic RRM offers
a similar defense performance as periodic RRM while it
causes much less overhead.
In summary, our contribution in this paper is threefold:
First, we model the attacker and the defender as players of a
signaling game and define their actions and payoff models.
Second, we solve the game and derive all possible Nash
equilibria of this game. According to the game results, we
also design a strategic mechanism to defend against SLFAs.
Finally, we evaluate the proposed mechanism by conduct-
ing extensive experiments considering different attack ap-
proaches and capabilities for different defense strategies.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we
discuss the preliminaries and relevant work. In Section 3,
we present the game model. In the following section, we
analyze the game and design a defense mechanism. Detailed
performance evaluation of the proposed work is presented
in Section 5. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 7.
2 PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we briefly discuss some concepts that we
applied in this research.
2.1 Moving Target Defense
A system typically offers resources for its clients’ usage. A
client accesses these resources through interfaces. An inter-
face is often considered as an access points to the system.
These access points create different attack surfaces with vari-
ous levels of capabilities and impacts on the system [17]. The
configurations of these attack surfaces usually do not change
over time. The static nature of attack surfaces helps launch
attacks easily. Once an attacker gains the system information
(IP addresses, Operating System, routing, etc.), s/he can use
that knowledge to exploit the system vulnerabilities.
MTD is a defense mechanism that provides security
through adding agility/dynamicity to the system, and thus
by changing the attack surface [18]. The system’s dynam-
icity deceives the attacker and increases his/her effort to
launch a successful attack [8]. There are several methods
to perform MTD, including updating software or network
characteristics of the system. Route mutation-based MTD
has been shown useful in defending against SLFAs [7].
2.2 Software Defined Networking
SDN proposes the separation of routing decisions from for-
warding tasks [19]. An SDN-based network architecture typ-
ically considers three layers: application, control, and data.
While the data layer (i.e., network switch) is responsible for
forwarding the data from one port to another, the control
layer (i.e., SDN Controller) is responsible for making the
decisions on routing rules. The application layer contains
network functions including but not limited to Intrusion
Detection System (IDS), firewall. It provides great flexibility
and efficiency for network management [20]. Thus, we
leverage SDN to implement our solution.
2.3 Attack Model
Stealthy link flooding attacks, such as the Coremelt [3]
and the Crossfire [4], have drawn lots of attention from
researchers recently. SLFAs are indirect attacks such that the
attacker targets the communication links instead of targeting
the server directly [21].
The attack model of this research considers Crossfire
attacks as the threat and the Autonomous System (AS) as the
target domain. Fig. 1 shows a Crossfire attack scenario. As it
can be seen from the Fig. 1, there is a target area that the at-
tacker plans to congest using the bots. The attack consists of
two phases: reconnaissance and attack. In the first phase, the
attacker uses bots residing at distributed locations to obtain
how network communication links and routes are formed
toward the target area. The attacker uses traceroute packets
to obtain the information about the network topology and
traffic routes. Leveraging this information, s/he obtains the
critical communication links that carry most of the data to
the target area. Finding these links is important as they will
be used in the second phase of the attack. The attacker
should also have the information about other servers in
the network. Some of these servers are used to send traffic
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Fig. 1: The Crossfire Attack
from bots in order to occupy the communication links. These
servers are called decoy servers. While the bots, often many
in number, send regular traffic to the decoy servers to evade
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs), the critical links suffer
with congestion, causing the target area isolated from its
clients.
Two different approaches are considered for an attacker:
• Stealthy Attacker: In this model, the attacker is not in a
rush to conduct the attack. S/he runs reconnaissance,
and accordingly creates a target link set. Sometimes
s/he stays idle in order to behave like legitimate users.
After that, s/he starts the attack phase to exhaust the
links’ bandwidth.
• Aggressive Attacker: In this approach, the attacker be-
haves more greedy and transmits more quickly to con-
gest the communication links. Reconnaissance attack is
performed, the information is collected and the attack
pattern is designed within a given short time for the
aggressive attacker.
Furthermore, an attacker often has a limited number of
bots. Thus, two qualitative capabilities are considered:
• Decent Attacker: The attacker has a small number of bots
to launch a Crossfire attack.
• Strong Attacker: The attacker has an extended capability
(i.e., a significantly increased number of bots) compared
to a decent attacker.
2.4 Proposed Defense Mechanism
Our proposed defense mechanism is based on a signaling
game. Note that the signaling game is a dynamic game,
in which the first move is made by the bot or legitimate
user, and the defender is the second player. The game
is incomplete information because the defender does not
know with whom it is playing. This uncertainty is modeled
with Nature. Moreover, we update the knowledge of the
defender in repeated interactions with other nodes. Both
players decide their actions according to their expected out-
come. We explain the details of the game model in Section
3. The high-level architecture of our defense procedure is
shown in Fig. 2. As can be seen in the Fig. 2, our system
first initializes the parameters depending on the network
environment and topology. Then, it checks if the conditions
to trigger defense strategy is satisfied. If the decision is made
as to defend, RRM is employed, and system parameters are
updated. If not, the defender stays idle until it receives an
action from the attacker. Each time an action received from
Initial Parameters
Apply defense 
strategies
Should defend?
Update  
Parameters
NO
YES
Wait for new 
action from 
the attacker 
Handle the 
action
Fig. 2: The procedure of defense decision
the attacker, the defender updates his/her parameters and
checks if it is time to defend.
3 CROSSFIRE ATTACK AND DEFENSE GAME
MODEL
In this section, we first give an overview of the proposed
game. Then, we define the players’ action sets and model
the belief function and payoffs.
3.1 Overview
In our Crossfire Attack and Defense Game model, a client
can be malicious (a bot corresponding to a Crossfire at-
tacker) or benign. Clients send various requests to the
servers in the target network. A bot makes ping and tracer-
oute requests so that the attacker can do the reconnaissance
(i.e., link map construction) to launch a Crossfire attack.
The security administrator of the target network (simply
the defender) can apply RRM to thwart this reconnaissance,
so the data phase of the Crossfire attack. In the case of
applying RRM, the defender randomly changes/mutates
the routing paths, thus changing the link map. We model
the interaction between the Crossfire attacker (in fact, each
bot individually) and the defender using a signaling game
Gcf . Signaling game is a two-player incomplete information
game, in which Nature has a unique randomizing strategy
(i.e., θ) that is commonly known to both the defender and
the attacker. With this randomizing strategy the type of
sender would be defined.
The first player, a.k.a. sender (here, the attacker/bot),
is informed of Nature’s choice and chooses an action. The
second player, a.k.a. the receiver (here, the defender), then
chooses an action without knowing Nature’s choice but ob-
serving the first player’s action. Our choice of the signaling
game is based on the dynamic and incomplete information
characteristic of the Crossfire attack, where the action of one
player is conditioned over its belief about the type of the
opponent. The action flow of the game is shown in Fig. 3.
The game Gcf is played individually with each
client/sender who can be a bot or a legitimate user. A bot
is considered as a type t1 sender, while a legitimate user
as a type t2 sender. We represent this set of sender types
4TABLE 1: Symbols used in manuscript
Symbol Definition
N Reconnaissance packet sender
G Regular packet sender
R Defender’s action as no RRM
R Defender’s action as RRM
α Attacker’s gain from single reconnaissance packet
θ Belief value of whether the client is legitimate or bot
β Cost for renting bots
δ Cost of not providing information to legitimate user
λ Gain of defending through reconnaissance
c Cost of applying RRM
f Frequency of Random Route Mutation (RRM)
Nc Number of hosts in the network
as T, i.e., T = {t1, t2}. The second player of game Gcf is
the defender. The game is played in the following steps, as
shown in Fig. 3. The defender receives two different types
of messages, i.e., Reconnaissance or Regular Traffic. Nature
draws type t1 or t2 with a probability of θ or 1 − θ,
respectively. The defender does not know exactly whether
the observed message is coming from a bot or a legitimate
user but s/he can only form/follow a belief. According to
this belief, the defender must decide whether to defend
by applying RRM or not. In the following subsections, we
define the actions of the players, and accordingly model the
belief and payoff functions. In the game, we often use the
term ”attacker” to represent a bot.
3.2 Action Sets
In game Gcf , we define the action set A of the first player
by an ordered pair (m(t1),m(t2)), where m(t1) is the action
of type t1 (i.e., a bot) and m(t2) is the action of type t2
(i.e., a legitimate user). We also assume that each sender,
irrespective of his/her type, can select his/her action from
the same action set. Let A be {N,G}, where N represents
sending reconnaissance packets while G is about sending
the usual/regular traffic. It is worth noting that if the
attacker sends reconnaissance packets (i.e., plays N ), then
the defender may become suspicious. On the other hand,
when the attacker sends regular traffic (i.e., plays G), s/he
will not gain necessary information.
By using these actions, the attacker can make a strategic
plan with a combination of actions. This strategy could
either be slow and stealthy, or quick and greedy. If the
attacker’s strategy is stealthy one as defined in Section 2.3,
a longer time will required to do the reconnaissance. In this
long period, there is a higher possibility to have changes
in the link map due to existing defense strategies (or even
usual network events). Hence, the attack will have less
chance to be successful. On the other hand, if the attacker
is so greedy about the attack, s/he might immediately do
harm yet possibly end up being caught quickly. Thus, the
attacker needs to do a trade-off between the time spent
for reconnaissance and the risk of being detected by the
defender. We will elaborate this issue in more detail in
Section 5.
Similar to the sender, the receiver/defender has an action
set B. It can respond/reply with a route mutation to deceive
the attacker (i.e., play R). Otherwise, it reply with no route
change (i.e., play R). Hence, B = {R,R}. If the defender
applies route mutation (i.e., R), then there will be an extra
cost depending on the time it takes to install flow rules on
network devices. The cost for the regular replies (i.e., R) is
considered as zero, since there is not any additional efforts
required. We will later elaborate on the defense cost when
we obtain the defender payoffs.
3.3 Belief Model
In game Gcf , the defender does not know whether it re-
ceives messages from an attacker or a legitimate user. Yet,
it observes these messages and builds the belief function
(i.e., θ) about the sender’s type based on this observation.
Remember that this θ is a common knowledge between
the sender and the receiver. The defender has a different
belief for each client/sender: θy , where 0 < y ≤ Nc.
Furthermore, to represent the belief at a time instance x, we
use the notation θy(x). The belief ranges from 0 to 1, while
0 showing no sign of suspicion of the client’s legitimacy.
The belief has two parts: the initial belief that is statically
calculated at the beginning of the game and the dynamic
belief that is updated according to the sender’s actions.
3.3.1 Initial Belief
In our environment, we assume there is no information
available about any client, and all clients are at the same
level of suspicion. Thus, we assign 0 to each initial belief
(i.e., θy(0)). However, the defender can assign different
values to the initial belief for each client if any prior in-
formation is available.
3.3.2 Dynamic Belief
The dynamic belief for a specific sender will be calculated
each time the game is played. The belief is defined based on
three different weighted factors, as shown in Equation (1).
While these factors are normalized values, the summation
of their weights are 1 (100%). The first factor is the previous
belief (i.e., θy(x − 1)) that is weighted by F1. The reason is
that if a client has been behaving suspicious or benign for
most of the time, his/her current action, which may be dif-
ferent than this characteristic, cannot eliminate (or changes)
his/her performance previously observed/learned. That is
why, we consider assigning a high weight (e.g., 90% ) to F1.
θy(x) = θy(x− 1)×F1+
∑Nc
k=1 θk(x− 1)
Nc
×F2+A(x)×F3
(1)
The second factor is the average of the beliefs for all the
network nodes (i.e.,
∑Nc
k=1 θk(x−1)
Nc ). This factor reflects the
Crossfire attack characteristic in which a number of bots are
used to perform the attack. F2 is the weight representing
its impact on the belief function and we consider it notable
(e.g., 9% ). The last metric we use to update our belief is
the current/latest packet that we have received from the
sender (i.e., A(x)). It’s weight is F3, which we consider
as small (e.g., 1% . Even though its weight is considered
small, it’s impact on the belief adds up rapidly as the sender
keeps sending packets to the receiver, and the game is
continuously played for each packet receipt.
3.4 Payoff Model
In this section, we calculate the benefit and cost of each of
the players considering all possible strategies. Let us first
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Fig. 3: Gcf signaling game model representation.
consider the case where the game is played between the
attacker/bot (i.e., the sender type is t1) and the defender.
This case is represented by the upper part of the signaling
game as shown in Fig. 3.
If the defender applies RRM (i.e., plays R) in response to
a reconnaissance message (i.e., the sender plays N ) from the
bot (i.e., given that Nature has chosen the bot to play with
a probability of θ), the defender can successfully defend the
targeted server(s) against the attack. Let us assume that α
represents the number of packet losses that the attacker
can cause by leveraging the information that is collected
through the reconnaissance process. In other words, α is
the numerical gain of the attacker. If we assume that the
frequency of running RRM, is f , then the benefit of the
attacker will be degraded for the higher frequency of RRM.
Hence,in this case, we model the benefit of the attacker
by 1f α. We designate the attacker’s cost by β, which is an
increasing function on the number of bots that are deployed
by the attacker in the network. This parameter also repre-
sents the capability of the attacker in our experiments: a
decent or strong capability. While the decent attacker can
afford a small number of bots, the strong attacker can deploy
more bots. The number of packets sent by the attacker can
be considered as another metric of the attacker’s cost, yet
this does not bring a direct cost to the attacker. Finally,
considering the calculated benefit and cost for the attacker
we conclude that the attacker’s payoff is 1f α− β.
We represent the benefit of the defender (gain of de-
fending against reconnaissance) by λ. This benefit is made
by giving the attacker wrong information about reconnais-
sance, which prevents the data phase of the attack. This
action brings protection to the network in terms of de-
creased packet loss. Moreover, we represent the total cost
of applying RRM by c, which is measured in terms of
additional delay and packet loss that might be caused due to
the flow table update. Given the calculated cost and benefit
for the defender, the payoff of the defender running RRM
against the bot is: λ− 1f α− c.
Following the above discussion for the payoffs of the
attacker and defender, if the defender does not react to
the reconnaissance messages of the bot, the payoff of the
attacker and defender will be −α and α − β, respectively.
With a similar analysis, we can show that the payoff of the
defender is −c. If it does not defend, the payoff would
be 0. The payoff of the attacker when s/he does not send
reconnaissance packets will always be equal to −β.
Now we consider the second game, where the players
are the legitimate user and the defender (i.e., the lower part
of the signaling game presented in Fig. 3). Since RRM does
not have significant impact on the legitimate users’ traffic,
we consider its payoff as zero for all possible actions of the
defender. However, running RRM against legitimate users
generates wrong information to the legitimate user, and it
may cause a problem with troubleshooting. We model this
effect by parameter δ. Hence, the payoff of the defender
when it runs RRM will be equal to −δ − c.
4 GAME ANALYSIS AND PROTOCOL DESIGN
In the following, we first examine game Gcf for the exis-
tence and properties of pure strategy Perfect Bayesian Nash
Equilibria (PBNE). We then use our analysis to design a
defensive protocol to optimize defender strategies against
Crossfire attacks.
4.1 Game Analysis: Perfect Bayesian Nash Equilibrium
In complete information or non-Bayesian games, a strategy
profile is a Nash equilibrium (NE) if every strategy in that
profile is a best response to every other strategy. However,
players in Bayesian games would like to maximize their
expected payoffs, given their beliefs about the other play-
ers [22]. A PBNE is characterized as a strategy profile and
belief that satisfy the following four requirements [23]:
Requirement 1: After observing any message mj from
sender j, the defender must have a belief about which types
could have sent mj . Denote this belief by the probability
distribution µ(ti|mj), where µ(ti|mj) ≥ 0 for each type ti,
and
∑
ti∈T µ(ti|mj) = 1
6Requirement 2: For each message mj , the defender’s action
a∗(mj) must maximize his expected utility ud, given the
belief µ(ti|mj) about which type could have sent mj . That
is, a∗(mj) satisfies:
max
mj∈M
∑
ti∈T
µ(ti|mj)ud(ti,mj , a(mj))
Requirement 3: For each type ti, the sender’s (whether a
bot or a legitimate user) message m∗(ti) must maximize his
utility (ud), given the defender’s strategy a∗(mj). That is,
m∗(ti) satisfies:
max
mj∈M
ud(ti,mj , a
∗(mj))
Requirement 4: For each mj ∈ M , if there exists type
ti such that m∗(ti) = mj , then the defender’s belief at
the information set corresponding to mj must follow from
Bayes’ rule and the sender’s strategy:
µ(ti|mj) = p(ti)∑
ti∈Tj p(ti)
where Tj denotes the set of types that send the message mj .
Considering the above requirements, we can now define the
PBNE.
Definition 1. A pure-strategy PBNE in a signaling game is
a pair of strategy m∗(ti) and a∗(mj) and a belief µ(ti|mj)
satisfying Requirements 1 to 4.
In the following, we use (p, 1 − p) and (q, 1 − q) to
denote the second player’s (the defender) beliefs at its two
information sets. Recall that for the defined signaling game
in Figure 3, the sender’s pure strategy determined by an
ordered pair (m(t1),m(t2)) where m(t1) and m(t2) are
the chosen strategies by user types t1 and t2, respectively.
Note that in our model t1 and t2 are bot and legitimate
types. Similarly, the defender’s strategy is determined by
an ordered pair (a(N), a(G)), in which a(N) and a(G)
demonstrate the defender strategy following the sender’s
reconnaissance and regular traffic signals, respectively.
Furthermore, a pure strategy PBNE profile is determined
as tuple {S1,S2, p, q}, in which S1 is the pair of the sender
strategy chosen by each type (whether bot or legitimate
user), S2 is the pair of defender strategy in response to
each signal, and p and q are attacker belief concerning the
type of sender for reconnaissance (N ) or regular (G) signal,
respectively. According to the sender pure strategy, two
kinds of PBNE could exist in signaling game, called pooling
and separating.
A PBNE is called pooling equilibrium if m(t1) = m(t2).
In other words, the bot and legitimate user send the same
signal, regardless of their types. In contrast, a PBNE is called
separating equilibrium if m(t1) 6= m(t2), i.e., the bot and
legitimate users send a different signal, depending on their
types. We now examine Gcf for (pure) PBNE. We first probe
the existence of pooling equilibria.
Given the definition of pooling and separating equilib-
rium, in the following, we derive all conditions under which
there exist these Nash equilibrium profiles in our defined
game. In other words, since the values of payoffs vary given
the topology of the network and the period of sending
different packets and probes in the reconnaissance phase,
there would be different conditions to be checked for the
existence of these Nash equilibrium points.
Theorem 1. For any values of θ, there exists a pooling equilib-
rium on N , in Gcf signaling game.
Proof. Let us suppose that there exists a pooling NE with
(N,N) strategy for the sender. Then the defender’s infor-
mation set corresponding to N is on the equilibrium path,
so the defender’s beliefs (p, 1 − p) at this information set is
determined by Bayes’ rule and sender’s strategy: p = θ. We
first compute the expected payoff of the defender given its
belief. The defender’s expected payoff for playing R is:
θ × (λ− 1
f
α− c) + (1− θ)× (−δ − c) (2)
And defender’s expected payoff for playing R is:
θ × (−α) + (1− θ)× (0) (3)
Comparing the above payoffs for the defender we can
define a threshold for belief, called θ∗, which is equal to
δ+c
δ+α(1+λ− 1f )
. We first assume that θ∗ ≤ 0, then the following
two cases could take place for the dominant strategy of the
defender:
• θ ≥ θ∗ := δ+c
δ+α(1+λ− 1f )
: Therefore playing R dominates
R, following N signal, which can be easily verified by
comparing the expected payoffs presented in Equations
(2) and (3).
Now we should check whether the senders have in-
centives to deviate from the N strategies, given the
defender strategy which isR in this case. If the defender
chooses strategy R for responding to message G, there
is no incentive for the senders to deviate from their
strategies. In fact, in that case, the sender of type 1 (t1
or Bot) achieves −β instead of 1f α − β. The sender of
type 2 (t2 or legitimate user) obtains 0 in both cases.
Hence, there is no incentive for the senders to deviate
from strategy N .
It remains to consider the defender’s belief at the infor-
mation set corresponding to G (i.e., off the equilibrium
path). We need to show if the strategy of playing R is
optimal given this belief. For this purpose and given
that the R is the best response when θ ≥ θ∗, we should
calculate the expected payoffs of the defender when it
plays R and R following strategy G. These payoffs are
q × −c + (1 − q) × (−δ − c) and q × 0 + (1 − q) × 0.
Since there are no values for q that makes the payoff of
defender greater for playing R, there is no pooling on
(G,G) when the defender plays (R,R).
Similarly, to verify if there exists a NE where the de-
fender plays (R,R) we should first show that there
are no incentives for the sender to deviate from the
pooling (N,N) strategy. This time considering the de-
fender strategy (R,R), both types of senders do not
have any incentive to deviate from N and play G as
their payoff would be decreased from 1f α − β to −β
for the bot player and the legitimate user, its payoff
remains 0. Now, we should again calculate the payoff
of the defender given its belief q. In other words,
this time we need to compute the values of q, where
q × −c + (1 − q) × (−δ − c) ≤ 0. Hence for all values
7of q ≤ 0, the payoff of the defender would be greater
when it playsR. Then, we can conclude that there exists
one pooling equilibrium {(N,N), (R,R), p = θ, q} for
any q in Gcf when θ ≥ θ∗.
• θ ≤ θ∗ := δ+c
δ+α(1+λ− 1f )
: In this case the best response
of the defender following N signal is R. Similar to
the previous case, we should first verify if there is
any incentive for the senders to deviate from N , if
the defender plays R and R off the equilibrium path.
Since both types will not gain any extra benefits (for
bots the payoff decreases from α − β to β and for
the legitimate users there is no differences), there is no
incentives for them to deviate from playing N . Similar
calculations can be done for the payoff of the defender,
off the equilibrium path to find the possible values for
q. Similar to the previous case, there are no values for
q, where the expected payoff of playing R would be
bigger than R. Considering all possible deviations for
the case that the defender plays R and the values of
the belief for q there exists another pooling equilibrium,
where {(N,N), (R,R), p = θ, q} for any q in Gcf when
θ ≤ θ∗.
Theorem 1 represents that if the selected strategy of both
types of the senders are N , there is an equilibrium consid-
ering the belief of the defender for the possible attacker. In
this case, depending on the value of θ, the defender should
select one of the strategies R or R upon receiving signal N .
In other words, if the probability of the sender being a bot
(i.e., θ) is greater than θ∗, the defender should run RRM .
Otherwise, the best response for the defender is playing R
strategy. In the case of θ ≥ θ∗ and θ ≤ θ∗, if users send
reconnaissance packets, the defender’s response will be R
and R, respectively.
Theorem 2. For any values of θ, there does not exist any pooling
equilibrium on G, in Gcf signaling game.
Proof. In the game Gcf for any values of belief θ, the de-
fender’s best respond to pooling strategy of (G,G) is always
R. In other words, the defender does not perform RRM in
this case. Consequently, we should see if the senders have
any incentive to deviate fromG strategy. Let us consider two
possible strategies of the defender off the equilibrium path
(when it believes in playing with Bot with probability p).
Since by deviating from G to N , the sender of type t1 (Bot)
can always increase his/her payoff from−β to 1f α−β (when
the defender plays R off the equilibrium path) or from −β
to α − β (when the defender plays R off the equilibrium
path), (G,G) cannot be at any pooling equilibrium.
Theorem 3. There is no separating equilibrium on (G,N) in the
Gcf signaling game.
Proof. Suppose (G,N) is a pair of senders’ strategy, then
both of the defender’s information sets are on the equilib-
rium path, so both beliefs are determined by Bayes’ rule and
sender strategy: q = 1 and p = 0. Defender’s best response
following these beliefs is always R, for both types of the
sender. Hence, we should check if the sender’s strategy is
optimal given the defender strategy. If the sender of type
1 deviates by playing N signal instead of G, the defender
responds with R, giving t1 (i.e., the Bot) a payoff of α − β,
which exceeds t1’s payoff of −β from playing G. Thus,
(G,N) cannot establish any separating equilibrium.
Theorem 4. There are two classes of separating equilibrium
{(N,G), (R,R), p = 1, q = 0} if λ ≤ α(1/f − 1) + c and
{(N,G), (R,R), p = 1, q = 0} λ ≥ α(1/f − 1) + c in the Gcf
signaling game.
Proof. Similar to Theorem 3, we first assume that (N,G) is a
pair of senders’ strategy. Then both of the defender’s infor-
mation sets are on the equilibrium path: p = 1 and q = 0.
Considering (N,G) strategy of the senders, the defender’s
best response following these beliefs can be calculated by
comparing the payoffs of the defenders. For sender with
type t1 (i.e., bot), the best response of the defender is calcu-
lated by comparing the following two payoffs: λ− 1f α−c and
−α. Two cases can be identified given that λ∗ = α( 1f −1)+c:
• λ ≥ λ∗: The best response to play N by type t1 is R
and the best response to type G by type t2 is R. We
should check, if the sender’s strategy is optimal given
the defender strategy. Since the bot payoff would be
decreased from 1f α−β to −β and there is no difference
for the legitimate payoff, we can conclude that the
{(N,G), (R,R), p = 1, q = 0} is a PBNE. We name
it as PBNE3 for later references.
• λ ≤ λ∗: In this case, the best response to play N by type
t1 is R and the best response to type G by type t2 is R.
Similar to the previous case there is no incentive for the
senders to deviate from (N,G) strategy.
The above results present all possible PBNEs of game
Gcf . Considering these equilibria, we can now provide the
best plan of actions for the defender given its belief about
the sender’s type and its payoff at different strategies.
4.2 Protocol Design
In this section, we design a strategic Crossfire defense
mechanism to optimize the strategy of the defender. Table 2
summarizes the results presented in Theorems 1, 2, 3, and
4. All possible separating and pooling PBNEs are displayed.
Leveraging these results, we design our proposed strategic
Crossfire defense mechanism, namely Strategic RRM. The
pseudocode of this proposed mechanism is given in Algo-
rithm 1.
In the Algorithm 1, we first pick a value for the frequency
(f ) of RRM that represents how often the defender can
perform RRM. It is decided through our preliminary exper-
iments. The minimum period of running RRM is shown as
P which is assigned to 1/f . Then the belief for each client
is initialized to zero at the beginning of the experiments.
The defender always updates its belief each time it receives
a packet, and it computes the potential gain/payoff. Later,
if the belief is greater than θ∗ and the received packet is
reconnaissance, the defender chooses to run RRM at the
end of P period. In addition to that, if the value of λ is
greater than λ∗, the defender should also run the RRM.
Hence, the optimal decision for the defender is obtained
according to equilibria PBNE1 and PBNE3. The same
8TABLE 2: Equilibria and Their Conditions
Theorem Conditions Range of θ # PBNE Condition on BeliefsOn-equilibrium Off-equilibrium
Theorem 1 − θ ≥ θ∗ PBNE1 {(N,N), (R,R), p, q} p = θ ∀q
Theorem 1 − θ ≤ θ∗ PBNE2 {(N,N), (R,R, ), p, q} p = θ ∀q
Theorem 4 λ ≥ λ∗ ∀θ∗ PBNE3 {(N,G), (R,R), p, q} p = 1 q = 0
Theorem 4 λ ≤ λ∗ ∀θ∗ PBNE4 {(N,G), (R,R), p, q} p = 1 q = 0
Algorithm 1 Strategic Crossfire Defense Mechanism
1: h: Host ID (i.e., its IP address) communicating with the
server
2: thalive: The time that host h is still transmitting packets
3: f : The frequency at which we can run RRM
4: P ⇐ 1
f
5: n := 1
6: θh ⇐ Initialize the belief for h
7: while ((n− 1)× T ) ≤ thalive do
8: Estimate/calculate α, β, λ, δ, and c.
9: for Each packet received from h between (n − 1)T and
nT do
10: Update θh according to the packet type (signal)
11: Compute θ∗ (Theorem 1)
12: Compute λ∗ (Theorem 4)
13: end for
14: if λ ≥ λ∗ then
15: Perform RRM
16: else if θ ≥ θ∗ then
17: Perform RRM
18: end if
19: n := n+ 1
20: end while
processes after the initialization will be performed every P
seconds.
5 EVALUATION
In this section, we briefly discuss our experimental setup
and evaluation metrics. Then, we present the findings from
the experiments.
5.1 Experiment Setup
The network environment is implemented using Mininet
[15] and FloodLight [16] is used as an SDN Controller. The
proposed signaling game-based defense strategy is devel-
oped as an application on top of the FloodLight Controller.
In the experimental setup, we consider the network topol-
ogy with 20 switches, 3 decoy servers, 1 target server, and
several clients, as shown in Fig. 4. The number of clients
differs for each experiment based on the attack model and
the purpose of the experiment. The target server is encircled
by red and decoy servers are placed interior part of the
network topology in Fig. 4. The bandwidth of each link
in the network is configured as 100 Mbps. A python-based
client/server application is implemented for the communi-
cation between host-target servers. We implement different
attacker models and apply in experiments to evaluate them.
The configuration of the network is further explained below.
5.1.1 Defender’s Setup
In our experiments, we consider 3 different configurations
for the defender. We name them as No Defense, Periodic RRM,
and Strategic RRM.
Fig. 4: Experimental Network Topology
• No Defense: To observe the worst-case attack scenario
the network environment is implemented without any
defense mechanism. In this case, the attacker can easily
gain the (static) routing information by doing recon-
naissance attacks. Next, s/he attacks the target links
which are found by using that static information.
• Periodic RRM: The second defense setup is based on per-
forming RRM periodically. The routes are changed pe-
riodically to the alternative ones that are pre-calculated.
We choose different values of frequencies to run RRM
in order to observe the impact.
• Strategic RRM: It is our proposed signaling game-based
defense mechanism. In this case, the defender takes
actions based on the attacker’s actions as explained in
Section 3.2. The mechanism is given in Algorithm 1 and
is implemented accordingly.
5.1.2 Attacker’s Setup
In a Crossfire attack setup, a decoy server does not receive a
large amount of traffic from one or multiple bots simultane-
ously so that the activity is not considered as suspicious
at the network administrator’s side. Thus, we limit each
bot’s communication to only 1 decoy server with a regular
amount of traffic. Each bot sends/receives approximately 5
Mbit of data per second in order to behave as legitimate.
We implement two different attacker behaviors, namely
aggressive and stealthy, with two different capabilities, such
as decent and strong, as mentioned in Section 2.3. The aggres-
9sive attacker’s time for reconnaissance is fixed to 1 minute
in experiments. The decent attacker has a limited number
of bots, which is as much as the number of legitimate
clients in the network. Meanwhile, the strong attacker is
equipped with a doubled number of bots. Even though the
attack impact is expected to increase, it should also be noted
that the more bots the attacker employs, the higher cost is
incurred on him/her. We run our experiments on each case
to show how effective our solution would be with different
attack models.
5.2 Evaluation Metrics
The application of RRM introduces some overhead cost on
the defender since it creates extra packets in the network.
This overhead can cause Quality of Service (QoS) problems
in a form of increased communication latency/packet delay
or a higher number of packet losses for the legitimate
users. We specifically consider the following metrics to be
measured in our experiments:
• Delay for using longer path: Using a randomized alterna-
tive path can cause longer end-to-end delay since the
route may not be the optimal/shortest anymore. This
metric shows the increase in delay compared to the
optimal path.
• Delay for flow table updates: Flow tables are updated
whenever RRM is triggered. This process of updating
flow table entries of switches takes time. This time
is measured to show additional delays that legitimate
clients are exposed to. Related to this issue, some of the
packets may drop if the queue of a switch becomes full
and it cannot handle any more packets whenever the
flow table is updated even though no attack is being
taken place.
• The number of packet losses: This metric represents the
number of packets lost for legitimate users due to
attacks or the execution of RRM.
5.3 Experimental Results
We run experiments on different network configurations to
observe each evaluation metric separately. We first show the
overhead of performing RRM on the network (i.e., legiti-
mate users) varying the RRM frequency, i.e., the interval
period between two subsequent route mutations. We find
the optimal period among them, and use this Periodic RRM
to compare with the proposed Strategic RRM by running
experiments with different adversary models.
5.3.1 Observing RRM Costs without any Attacker
We run our experiments without considering any malicious
activities in the network in order to measure the defender’s
cost (i.e., the cost imposed on its clients). In the experiments,
we measure the additional delay that is caused due to up-
dating flow tables as well as using longer paths when RRM
is applied. We first change the RRM frequency to observe the
flow table update cost. Here, the routing paths are kept the
same. Then, to assess the delay for using longer paths, we
run experiments selecting optimal (shortest length) paths as
well as non-optimal (alternative) paths.
Table 3 presents the average packet delay for 4 randomly
selected legitimate clients. We can easily see that a higher
frequency of RRM (i.e., when RRM interval period is 10
seconds) brings additional delay to the clients if alternative
path sizes are the same as the optimum path. The slight
difference between each column is caused by flow table
updating. As an example, we can take a look at the delays
for Client 1: during the 60-seconds period RRM, the average
delay is 2892 milliseconds, while the delay becomes 3040
milliseconds and 3398 milliseconds when the periods are
30-seconds and 10-seconds, respectively. Even though the
difference between them looks negligible (in milliseconds),
it should be noted that the average delay is computed for
approximately 100 thousands of packets in a 10-minute long
experiment. Thus, the sum of additional delays that are
caused by flow table updates, is a significant cost consid-
ering the delay increase for 100 thousands of packets where
only a few times flow table updates are performed. We
can also observe in Table 3 that if we use alternative (i.e.,
non-optimal) paths for clients, the average delay increases
significantly. This is because the increased number of hops
adds further delay to the packet communication.
Next, we assess if the route updates can cause packet
drops. The experimental setup remains the same as the
previous ones except we consider a higher number of clients
to send more simultaneous packets in order to occupy the
queues/buffers at the switches and simulate an environ-
ment that would more likely occur during Crossfire attacks.
We use small sized packets (100 bytes each) so that the
link bandwidth cannot be a cause of packet dropping. The
results from the experiments are presented in Table 4. We
observe that a higher frequency of RRM causes a larger
number of packet drops. This is reasonable considering
switches are busier updating their flow tables in the cases
where more often route changes are occurred. In other
words, some of the packets cannot be handled on time and
are dropped because of overflowing of the queue.
The 60-seconds RRM case causes fewer delays and less
packet loss compared to 30-seconds and 10-seconds RRM
cases if there is no attack, as shown in Tables 3 and 4.
In other words, the 10-seconds RRM case causes lots of
overhead compared to 60-seconds RRM. Thus, we opt to run
60-seconds RRM in the following experiments to compare
with Strategic RRM.
5.3.2 Comparing Strategic RRM with Periodic RRM
The values for different game parameters of Strategic RRM
are chosen as shown in Table 6. These parameters are ob-
served and tuned based on our preliminary experiments on
the RRM cost and the impact of attacks. More specifically, α
is the attacker’s gain, and it is considered as the percentage
of packet losses due to the attack (when there is No Defense
mechanism), which is 3% where the attacker is stealthy and
decent, as shown in Table 5. This value increases if the
attacker’s strategy is more intense or network size is smaller.
Parameter λ is the gain of the defender that s/he earns by
defending against the reconnaissance attack. It is calculated
by deducting 0.7% packet loss when the 60-seconds Periodic
RRM is applied from 3% packet loss when there is No
Defense mechanism. Thus, λ is set at 2.3. λ increases if RRM
is applied more often than 60-seconds. The parameter δ is
the cost of the defender with respect to the legitimate users.
We derive this parameter as the percentage of increase in
the average packet delay from the case of No Defense (a
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TABLE 3: Delay Caused by RRM (in microsecond)
Client Delay Delay with RRM
ID Without Optimum size Path Any size Path
RRM 60-seconds RRM 30-seconds RRM 10-seconds RRM 60-seconds RRM 30-seconds RRM 10-seconds RRM
1 2853 2892 3040 3398 3781 3717 4053
2 2854 2898 3050 3406 3761 3616 4145
3 1497 1533 1629 1882 1973 2075 2351
4 1499 2161 2322 2698 2986 3205 3578
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Fig. 5: Packet Loss with Strong Attacker
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Fig. 6: Packet Loss with Decent Attacker
TABLE 4: Packet Drop Caused by Flow Table Update
10-seconds RRM 30-seconds RRM 60-seconds RRM
10.1% 8.6 % 1.6%
delay of 2175 microseconds) to the case of 60-seconds RRM
(a delay of 2371 microseconds). Hence, we calculate δ as 9.
The value of δ would increase if RRM is applied more often.
In addition, we assign 1.6 to c since it is the packet loss (as
shown in Table 4) in the case of 60-seconds RRM. The cost
variable, c, increases if RRM is more frequent.Finally, we
consider the minimum possible interval of running RRM as
1 second. Hence, the frequency (f ) is set to 1.
In Strategic RRM, the defender builds its belief about
each of its clients of being a bot and perform RRM accord-
ingly as it is mentioned in Section 3.3. In other words, the
attacker is able to run a stealthy attack initially until the
belief increases to some extent. Therefore, it is expected to
see more packet losses for Strategic RRM at the beginning of
the experiments. Meanwhile, it is also expected that Periodic
RRM causes a similar number of packet losses since it has
the same strategy throughout the experiments.
In the next experiments, we implement a different attack
models for each defender type and run them separately.
In order to observe the performance in different attack
models, we plot the graphs individually in Fig. 5 and
Fig. 6. Packet loss percentage and average delay for all
network nodes are given in Table 5. The attacker model
demonstrated in Fig. 5a considers a strong one with an
aggressive behavior. As the Fig. 5a shows, in the case of
No Defense, the number of packet losses are high and it stays
almost similar throughout the experiments. However, in the
cases of Periodic RRM and Strategic RRM mechanisms, the
scenario changes dramatically. Strategic RRM has a much
less number of packet losses after the first few minutes of the
experiment. This initial period takes the belief to a state at
which RRM starts to perform properly against the possible
bots. An important observation is that Periodic RRM usually
has a higher number of packet losses continuously since it
changes the routes at every time interval of the period which
may not overlap with the attacker’s reconnaissance phase.
However, this is not the case for Strategic RRM. It defends
against the attack only when there are highly suspicious
activities, which is reflected by the increased belief and the
equilibrium conditions. Another interesting observation in
Fig. 5a is that the peak number of packet losses appears
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TABLE 5: Cost Metric for Different Attacker Model
Attacker Packet Loss Average Delay (in milliseconds)
Model No Defense Periodic RRM Strategic RRM No Defense Periodic RRM Strategic RRM
Strong-Aggressive 31% 22% 16% 1172 989 438
Strong-Stealthy 15% 7% 10% 579 380 278
Decent-Aggressive 7% 2% 2% 464 251 200
Decent-Stealthy 3% 0.7% 1% 263 168 141
TABLE 6: Parameters Used in Simulation
Parameter Name α λ δ c f
Value 3 2.3 9 1.6 1
at the beginning of the RRM cases, not in the No Defense
case. This can be explained as the nature of RRM. Since it
is based on random mutation, it may cause more routes to
the same link which can end up congesting that specific link
intensively. However, in No Defense case, the attacker can
only target the same link set unless new bots are added and
new routing paths are identified. In this attack model, the
overall network’s packet loss percentages are 31% for No
Defense, 22% for Periodic RRM, and 16% for Strategic RRM
as presented in Table 5. Average transmission delays are
parallel to the packet loss results and decrease from 1172
milliseconds at No Defense case to 989 milliseconds Periodic
RRM case, and to 438 milliseconds in Strategic RRM case.
In addition to the attacker with an aggressive behavior,
we also consider a stealthy one and represent the results
in Fig. 5b. In this graph, we can see unbalanced results
which are basically due to the attacker’s dynamic behavior.
The stealthy attacker model can stay idle some of the time
and can do longer reconnaissance attacks. Hence, it leads
to such uneven consequences. Unlike the aggressive attack
model, Strategic RRM has higher packet losses (i.e., 10%)
compared to Periodic RRM case’s packet loss (i.e., 7%), even
after the belief gets time to be matured as shown in Table
5. The main reason behind this behavior is the characteristic
of the stealthy attacker model where the attacker reduces
and increases the attack intensity randomly making the
defender’s belief change more often. Even though Strategic
RRM has higher packet loss, the average transmission delay
is 278 milliseconds for the Strategic RRM case while it is
380 milliseconds in Periodic RRM. Moreover, it should be
noted that Periodic RRM brings additional overhead to the
network even if there is not an attack targeting the network.
Hence, we claim that it is reasonable to use Strategic RRM
considering the overall advantages.
Furthermore, we run the same experiments with a decent
attacker. As we defined earlier, the number of bots he has is
half of the bots that the aggressive attacker has. The results
are shown in Fig. 6, which are correlated with the ones
in Fig. 5. One significant observation is that the numbers
of packet losses are decreased by more than half. In other
words, increasing the number of bots, as in the aggressive
case, raises the damage significantly, more than a linear
increase. It is easily noticed that the number of packet losses
goes down to zero in the case of the decent attacker as
shown in Fig. 6a and Fig. 6b. This is because there are fewer
bots to be protected against. The other result to pay attention
is that there is a more high number of packet losses consec-
utively in Strategic RRM compared to a strong attacker since
less number of bots create less suspicion compared to more
bots as it is shown in Equation (1). This interesting outcome
can be seen in the comparison of Fig. 5b and Fig. 6b. In
addition to that, Strategic RRM has almost the same overall
contribution (e.g., 2% for aggressive, and 1% for stealthy) to
the network defense compared to Periodic RRM (e.g., 2% for
aggressive, and 0.7% for stealthy) as reported in Table 5. Yet,
there is still a notable transmission delay decrease from 251
milliseconds to 200 milliseconds with Aggressive Attacker,
and from 168 milliseconds to 141 milliseconds with Stealthy
Attacker whenever Strategic RRM is used.
6 RELATED WORK
In this section, we talk about other’s works in a similar
area. We first explain research papers proposing defense
mechanisms against SLFAs, and later we discuss signaling
games paper for cybersecurity.
6.1 Defense Mechanisms for SLFA
There are various defense mechanisms proposed for the
SLFA in literature. Only a few of them consider defending
against reconnaissance phase of the attack [24] [13] while
most of them strive to protect the network during the data
phase of the attack [11] [10] [25] [26] [12] [6]. Authors
in [24] claim traceroute packets are increased before an
SLFA occurs and they design a detection mechanism for the
attacker based on that assumption. Even though we also
have a similar belief that traceroute packets will increase
before the attack, we do not rely on this feature individually
and our attack mitigation technique is different. Meier et al.
obfuscates the attacker’s reconnaissance by replying with
some virtual hops that is consistent with the network topol-
ogy [13]. While this solution aims to prevent the attacker
to gain critical information, it gives wrong information to
legitimate users. We argue that this approach is not the
best practice since a legitimate user needs to get the right
information in order to utilize the network facilities in the
most efficient way. Otherwise, he might use longer path, and
suffer higher transmission delays.
Meanwhile, authors in [11] propose Traffic Engineering
(TE) as a solution to mitigate an SLFA . In their solution,
the defender forces the attacker to use the improbable path
(i.e., very unlikely to be used) so that the attacker ends up
being identified. Similarly, observing traffic patterns while
attack happens is applied to detect and defer an SLFA in
[10]. The main problem with these solutions is that they are
reactive and some critical harm could have been done before
the attack is mitigated. Traffic engineering based solution
is also used by authors in [25]. The authors suggest up-
grading switches to SDN-based switches in order to detect
and mitigate an SLFA. However, it is not specified how
to upgrade switches in run-time and how SDN switches
are capable of detecting such attacks. In [26], even though
collaboration between ASes is shown helpful whenever an
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SLFA hits, it is not clear how to manage different ASes to
work together. [12] observes link-probers by checking the
packets at the ingress port. If a sender is found as link-
prober, then Linkbait applies MTD to confuse its route. They
suggest matrix-based feature extraction in order to detect
which link-prober is a bot. In [6], authors propose utilizing
SDN capabilities to detect the attacker’s activities and block
the malicious activity. While our solution is similar to [12]
and [6], we do not rely on identifying bots which could not
be possible with an intelligent adversary model. Differently,
we have designed a signaling game which lets the defender
to decide which action to take considering his/her payoff.
6.2 Signaling Games for Cybersecurity
In many cybersecurity scenarios, the defender cannot clearly
detect whether the received messages are coming from a
benign user or they are a part of the attack scenario and
are initiated by attackers. Signaling game is a two-player
incomplete information game that has been used to model
different cybersecurity problems, such as intrusion detection
[27] or deception [28]. Furthermore, the authors model
cybersecurity in terms of signaling games in [29] and W.
Casey et al. model deception with signaling game in [30].
They present how signaling games provide a formal math-
ematical method to analyze the way of identity and decep-
tion coupling in cyber-social systems. The game-theoretic
framework can be extended to reason about dynamical
system properties and behavior traces. In [31], the authors
formulate a deception with signaling game in networks in
which the defender deploys a fake avatar for identifica-
tion of the compromised internal user. In [32], the authors
propose a selective and dynamic mechanism for counter-
fingerprinting. They model and analyze the interaction be-
tween a fingerprinter and a target as a signaling game.
Following this work in [33], the authors suggest changing
attack surface (e.g., port numbers) depending on a belief
that is observed in the signaling game. In [34], the authors
investigate the interactions between a service provider and
a client by signaling game, where the client does not have
complete information about the security conditions of the
service provider. In [35], the authors propose a moving
target-based deceptive defense mechanism using a signaling
game for the frequency of migrations of the virtual machines
in clouds. While we also apply signaling game for network
defense, we propose using RRM which has not been studied
under a signaling game. Furthermore, our framework is
applied not only to reconnaissance attacks but also real
data phase of the attacks. The reason behind choosing and
applying the signaling game approach specifically for SLFA
is that we believe the dynamic and unnoticeable behavior of
SLFA can be modeled into a signaling game accurately.
7 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we present a signaling game-based dynamic
MTD to defend against Crossfire attacks. We first model the
attacker and the defender as a signaling game. Considering
their payoffs, we compute the equilibria of the game, which
represent the best strategies for each player considering the
opponent is rational. According to the game results, we
develop an algorithm, namely Strategic RRM. We implement
and compare it with Periodic RRM. Our experimental results
show that Strategic RRM can lessen the impact of Crossfire
attacks similar to Periodic RRM, while it brings significantly
less overhead. As the future work, we would like to extend
our strategic MTD-based framework for other DDoS-based
emerging attacks.
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